Introduction
The turnaround in the external financial position of many debtor countries since 1989 has been phenomenal. Improvement is particularly impressive in countries that have completed Brady Plan restructuring of their external debt. In the first quarter of 1989 these countries' external debt sold for an average price of only forty cents on the dollar and private capital inflows were largely restricted to conceded lending or interest arrears. Various plans for dealing with thc debt overhang, including the Brady Plan announced on March 10, 1989, were widely characterized as inadequate to restore access to international capital markets. Some observers, in fact, predicted that debtor countries might not return to private international capital markets for a generation.2
Today the recovery in rM economic activity and capital formation in debtor countries is just beginning, but a financial recovery is well under way. These countries have experienced very large private capital inflows, real exchange rate appreciation, stock market booms, and dramatic increases in the prices of their external debt (Calvo, Lciderman and Reinhart, 1992) . In some eases capital inflows have been associated with a return to resource transfers to these countries similar to those recorded in the 1970sas measured by the emergence of sizable balance of trade deficits. Do we understand enough about the 1982 crisis to predict that renewed accumulation of external debt can avoid a repeat of 1982 and the considerable costs that followed for debtor countries? Unless the memories of invcstors and residents of debtor countries arc very short, they must believe that there is a difference in the expected outcome of this new round of international investment. Js the debt crisis dead, as suggested by several observers recently? Or is it only sleeping? 2 'Implementation of the Brady Plan,' US Senate (1990) for rcveral prominent economists' views that Brady rcstnicturing would have little cfrcct on the outlook for debtor countries' access to international credit markets.
To understand this turnaround in market access it is necessary to identify the main factors that can account for the remarkable improvements in debtor countries' creditworthiness. We first argue that secondary market prices for syndicated credits arc a useful measure of market access. We then show that changes in international interest rates, and induced changes in real exchange rates and real domestic interest rates in debtor countries, can account for jJ of the improvement in secondary market prices after the first round of Brady Plan restructuring agreements in early 1990. The empirical relationship between secondary market prices and international interest rates is robust to changes in model specification and to the time period considered. In particular, the dominance of international interest rates holds both before 1989, when yields on sovereign credits rose over time (prices declined), and after 1989 when yields generally declined (prices rose). This is further confirmed by recent developments outside the period of our estimations. After this paper was prepared, during February and March 1994 US interest rates increased substantially while secondary market prices dramatically declinecL3
The decline in real long term interest rates on dollar denominated debt is certainly reversible, and, in fact, it might very well be reversed in the next year or so. If domestic real interest rates in debtor countries were to rise also and real exchange rates decline, as would be normal, many developing countries would probably again experience debt servicing difficulties.
In the next section the relationship between capital inflows and secondary market prices is developed further. In section 3 a simple model of secondary market prices is proposed and estimated. Section 4 applies these estimates to an "avenge" Brady plan country in order to evaluate the source of recent capital inflows. Section 5 summarizes the results. 3me ten-yen US Treasury bond rate increased by about 15%, from 5.7% to 6.6% per year, while the market price index fell by a similar proportion. 
Capital Inflows and Secondary Market Prices
The secondary market price of debt is a useful barometer for the climate for private capital inflows to a debtor cowitry because it reflects both private investors' expectations concerning the ability of debtor governments to service existing debts and yields on alternative international investments. The secondary market price is a sensitive indicator because it is established in an active market for a relatively homogeneous financial instrument. F'urthcrrnorc it is also more up to date and accurate than private capital flow data-useful properties for an indicator.
Rising secondary market prices (falling yields) suggest that residents of the debtor country can also issue new debt or equity on better terms. The important implication for understanding recent capital inflows is that a larger volume of new borrowing, or sales of cquity, can credibly be serviced at lower yields. Thus, an improvement in secondary market prices was a precondition for recently observed private capital inflows to debtor countries. Moreover, a return of secondary markets to levels reached in 1989 would certainly stop and probably reverse recent capital inflows. While several recent papers have attempted to directly explain private capital inflows, this has proven to be a difficult task. The fact that private inflows have been offset by official outflows, generally in the form of increases in international reserve assets, makes the existence of a stable relationship between expected yields and private capital flows unlikely. Different policy reactions over time clearly contaminate reduced form relationships between expected yields and private capital flows. For this reason we focus on the expected yield required to induce investors to hold existing debt as the best proxy for the terms on which residents of emerging markets can issue new debt and equity.
There are two fundamcnul reasons for changes in the terms on which investors hold new and existing claims on residents of developing countries. The first is changes in yields available on alternative investments measured in this paper by an appropriate risk-free dollar interest rate.
The second is a change in investors' evaluation of the credit risk peculiar to the developing country.4 While easily observed secondary market prices undoubtedly reflect other factors such as the relative status of government and private debt, our working hypothesis is that the value of sovereign debt is closely related to investors overall assessment of the outlook for expected returns on existing and new investments in the debtor country relative to expected returns on altcrnative investments (Dooley et al., 1990 Debt Reduction A simple model for secondary market prices sets the market price equal to the ratio of expected present value of debt service payments to the contractual value of outstanding debt. It follows that secondary market prices risc when the numerator, expcctcd payments, rises relative to the dcnominator, the contractual value. Consequently, these prices axe linked to country creditworthincss.5 Debt or debt service reduction is expected to increase the price if the present 4Fora formal model of capital inflows adjusting to equalize alternative yields see Fernandez-Arias (1993) . 5mc relationship bctwecn priccs and country risk is distorted in some of the instnzments used in Brady operations by two factors, however. First, in the numerator, collateral enhancements increase the value of those instnimcnts. Second, in the denominator, below.market interest rates such as in Brady par bonds, amounts to a lower effective contractual value. These two biases counteract each other and may conceivably offset in the casc of par bonds, which would justify the usual practice of using par bond prices. In general, however, they do not offset each other and need to be adjusted to obtain the so-called stripped prices1 whose le3el would better reflect. country creditworthiness (See Table 2 for details). In practice, the aa in these stripped prices can be approximated by value of expected payments does not fall proportionately with the reduction in the contractual value of the debt.6 As documented by Bacha (1992) Brady comics refer to Argentina, Costa Rica, the Philippines, Mexico Nigeria, Uruguay and Venezuela. Non-Brady coimbies rerer to Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bolivia, Emil, Bulgaria, Cainaooai, Congo. Cole divoire, Ecuador Jamaica, Jordan, Morocco, Panama Pens, Poland, Syria, Chile Egypt, Honduras, Htmgazy, Nicaragua and SgaL Sowee: Salmon Bros.. !P& LDC Debt Repon. and World Bank data.
There is much less agreement concerning the quantitative importance of debt reduction.
The initial skepticism about the Brady Plan on the part of many academic economists was based on a simple argument. The Plan was voluntary in the sense that banks would not be forced to exchange their existing claims for new claims with a lower cxpcctcd market value. The implication was that debt reduction would be expensive in the sense that private debt retired by the changes in the prices of floating-rate instruments. Dooley (1988) fort general discussion of buybacks and market prices.
the Brady Plan would be purchased at a price higher than the market price that would prevail if the Plan were not implemented. As pointed out in Dooley (1988) . such price can be expected to reflect the market value of debt remaining alter the agreement was implemented if banks can frce-nde as in open-market buybacks. If the banks were in a less strong bargaining position, the price would be lower and more debt reduction would be possible for the same amount of resources, but always limited by the banks' voluntary participation constraint. Given these constraints it is possible to calculate the range of debt reduction that would result given the resources available to support the deal. As shown by Claessens, Diwan, and Fernandez-Arias (1992) . Brady operations led to prices and debt reduction falling within the theoretical ranges. Table 1 provides a summary of the debt reduction obtained by various countries.
Column 1 shows debt retired as measured by the reduction in the present value of debt service obligations. Debt reduction reflects reductions of contractual debt and interest service as well as collateralization and new money promises. For example, in agreements where below-market interest rates on collateralized par Brady bonds were exchanged for old floating rate debt, we calculate the difference in the present value of the debt service obligations of the two bonds on the exchange day assuming that each would be serviced in full as contracted. The methodology used is almost identical to the one used in Claesscns, Diwan and Fernandez-Arias (1992) , where the reader is referred for details.7 7Thc only difference is the trcatmcnt of additional new money, whose negative effect on dcbt reduction is estimated as a fraction of its nominal value (the fraction being the a-ante price). Since new money promises on the part of bank, were often conditional on countries serving interest over a period of time (not a sure thing in the absence of the deal as reflected in low priccs), this estimation is probably better. Column 3 shows thc nct paymcnt rcccivcd by commcrcial banks. This cash was used to purchasc collateral for new bonds or more directly for buybacks, but in gcncral the reduction in (lie contractual present valuc of debt was largely indcpcndcnt of (tic financial cnginccring irivolvcd. Thcsc calculations indicate that (lie amount olrcsourccs dcvo(cd to the agreements arc more than a third of tl,c reduction in the contracted prcscnt value of private dcbt. Substantial additional official Icnding partially offset the reduction in commercial bank debt. Column 4 shows tlic dollar amount ol additional loans madc to the debtor govcnsmcnt by international organizations and creditor governments to support the Brady Ptaa Thus the pci..dcbt reduction is lower and represents only IS percent of total dcb (columns 5 and 6). II 'snot difficult to Sec why many doithted that this level oldcbt reduction would 1c decisive in rtcstablislung access to capital nnrkcts. If future repayments to commcreial banks axe positively linked to the country's future perfonnance, then the efficiency gains of these DDSR operations can be gauged by analyzing the impact of the operation on prices. In fact, in the absence of efficiency gains, in proportional terms (stripped) prices would not be expected to increase beyond the decrease in commercial bank debt (column 2). As pointed out by Dooley ci al. (1990) , a fiJi! evaluation of the impact of debt reduction on the value of remaining private debt should consider the relative seniority of the various types of debt and the probability that the debtor would have received the loans for another purpose. If all creditors have the same implicit seniority and share the net present value of repayments in proportion to exposure, a hypothesis consistent with the findings in Demirguc- Kunt and Fernandez-Arias (1992) and in Bulow, Rogoff and Bevilaqua (1992) , then in the absence of efficiency gains (stripped) prices would not increase beyond the decrease in total debt (column 6). Any excess price increase over the no efficiency gain benchmark could then be safely attributed to efficiency gain9
Unfortunately, the task of estimating the increase in prices due to the operation is extrcmcly difficult because the appropriate counterfactual price, the price prevailing in the 8Likc the calculation of dcbt reduction equivalent, the methodology for estimating strippcd prices is taken from Claessens, Diwan, and Fernandez-Arias (1992) , except with respect to the impact of additional new money. 9l3ut pumly empirical results should dcal with the Ihcomtical implications cxplomd in a recent study by Bulow, Bogoff and Thu (1994) , which suggests vezy low efficiency gains.
absence of the operation, is not observable. Long before the operation was consummated pt-ices reflected the market expectations on the outcome of the future operation, which contaminate the observed prices to an unknown extent. For example, if the last price quoted before the operation incorporates a perfect forecast of the operation, its comparison with the stripped pt-icc does not provide any meaningful information on the effects of a given operation.
Prices before the Brady announcement in March 1989 may not be subject to this contamination but do not reflect the changes in fundamentals over the period leading to the operation date. For this reason, results based on these prices (shown in column 7) need to be taken with caution. Nevertheless, as analyzed in the next section, the evidence shows that the only important fundamental with significant variation that was identified is international interest rates after 1990. Therefore, except for the recent operations, especially Argentina, estimations and inferences made on this basis appear reasonable.
3b. Economic Policy Reform
A second important aspect of the Brady Plan agreements was the conditionality associated with the official credit It is plausible that the conditionality associated with the Brady Plan agreements explains the increased market value of existing debt and the turnaround in access to external markets. It is even morn difficult to quantifj the effects of economic reform on market valuations of external debt, but it certainly appears that policies changed for the better in Brady Plan countries. The widespread adoption of market oriented reform programs along with aggressive fiscal reform may have been an additional important channel through which the Brady Plan workouts improved the financial position of debtor countries. It is perhaps not surprising that creditor governments emphasized this aspect of the Plan, cx ante, but it may have been a surprise that some of the debtor countries implemented fiscal reform changes as consistently and aggressively as thcy have. This suggests that the impact of fiscal reforms were not fully credible at the time of the exchanges. Perhaps the effect of improved fiscal policies on secondary market prices may have been gradually incorporated into market prices in countries where the reform in fact occurred. One measure of a number of important policy changes is the increase in government revenue net of expenditures other than debt service --what is usually called the primary fiscal surplus)0 As shown in Table 2 , some Brady Plan debtors have made very impressive progress in placing their budgets on a basis where considerable debt service payments can be financed through taxation rather than additional borrowing. Sovrce: GoMaan Sacks (1991 . 1992 Another useful measure of fiscal performance the primiuy surplus less i interest payments Improvements in this surplus relative to the primary surplus am international real interest rates or a fall in the stock of debt The operational balances in Table 2 reflects the combined impact of all of these factors.
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Proceeds from privatization am includcd as a mvernle.
is the operational budget balance. This is on both domestic and external dcbt. is to identify what part of the reduction in real interest payments is a permanent part of the debtor countrie& positions. One aspect that is clearly permanent is real debt amortization. A surplus for this operational budget balance for past years means that the real value of outstanding debt is being reduced. As shown in Table 3 , some debtor countries have made substantial gains in reducing the real value of their net government debt through a normal amortization of domestic and foreign debt. For sortie countries this has been more important than the debt reduction discussed above. It is also possible that the fiscal reform will generate a permanent reduction in the default premia incorporated in interest rates. It is much less clear, however, that the real interest rates paid on remaining debt will remain at their current levels over the next few years. We turn to the complex and interdependent roles of domestic and international interest rates in the next two subsections. The potential importance of the fall in international interest rates arises from two sources.
First, there are good theoretical reasons to believe that the value of both fixed and floating rate Brady bonds should rise more than proportionally to percentage declines in internatinnal interest rates, Second, domestic interest rates paid by debtor governments should fall with international rates and there are good theoretical reasons to predict that the reduction will be more than proportionaL
To evaluate the effects of changes in international interest rates it is necessary to identi& a relevant "discount rate" at which investors translate expected payments from the debtor government into a present value. Since most of the external debt is denominated in US dollars, the appropriate discount rate is a risk-free real interest rate available on a dollar denominated investment that is similar in terms of maturity and in the terms on which the contractual interest rate is adjusted over time. This is not a straightforward problem. In particular it would at first seem natural to compare floating rate sovereign debt to floating rate risk free debt. The problem with this approach is that for risk free floating rate instruments, changes in market interest rates alter the nominal value of expected payments in fixture time periods. But this is exactly offset by the change in the discount rate so that the present value of these payments is unchanged.
With floating rate sovereign credits that trade at a considerable discount the effect of a change in real risk free rate is quite different Assuming that the change in the real risk free rate does not change the government's ability or willingness to pay, the value of expected payments in fixture time periods does not change. It follows that the present value of these payments does change. Thus, both floating rate sovereign credits (and stripped prices) respond to a fall in international interest rates in a manncr usually associated with fixed rate long term bonds. To the extent that repayments are shared by foreign creditors in proportion to contractual debt service, the response of fixed-rate sovereign credits would be even more pronounced because it would increase its share.
t4
If future payments are expected to grow over time, as can be expected in a growing economy, then the increase in their present value would be proportionally larger than the decrease in the risk-free rate. Furthermore, if the foreign debt is lower in priority of payment to other types of debtor government expenditure, secondary market prices would tend to rise by more than the percentage increase in the present value of total expected payments.
This is a potentially important aspect in understanding the relationship between international interest rates and secondary market prices. Unlike substantially risk-free instruments, a fall in the discount rate increases the present value ofth floating and fixed rate debt of over-indebted countries. Preliminary evidence of the relative performance of floating and fixed rate Brady bonds indicates that investors consider default on both bonds equally likely and that market prices of both types of bonds respond to changes in the discount rate as if they were fixed rate instruments.
3d. Domestic Interest Rates
A change in international interest rates is probably reinforced by changes in domestic interest rates. Most internal debt is rolled over several times a year in debtor countries, and so real debt scrvicc payments arc very sensitive to changes in domestic real interest rates. This is an interesting paxt of these governments' expenditures because, relative to real interest payments to foreign creditors, real interest rates paid on their domestic debt show a much higher variance and much higher avenge levels before 1990. Although internal debt is typically smaller than external debt for these countries, changes in pj real domestic interest payments have been an important component of total debt service costs.
A rise in domestic debt service payments should, for a given overall capacity to pay, reduce cxpectcd payments on external debt and in turn lower secondary market prices for cxtcr-nal debt. If changes in international interest rates generate qualitatively similar changes in domestic the effect of international interest rates on secondary market prices.
3e. Exchange Rates
The potential importance of the real exchange rate of the debtor countxy is straightforward-Government revenue in domestic currency can cover greater debt service payments if the foreign currency value of revenues rises, as happens when the local currency appreciates. Other things being equal, the real appreciation of debtor country currencies shown in Figure 3 increased the dollar value of government revenues devoted to external debt service.
As with the other variables discussed above, the relevant measure of the real exchange rate is that expected to prevail over the life of the contract For tack of a better prediction we can take the current value as an unbiased, but certainly poor, prediction of its future values. As with domestic interest rates it is also important to consider the relationship between exchange rates and international interest rates. Capital inflows associated with low international interest rates induce exchange rate appreciation that reinforces the improvement in secondary market prices. 
Uruguay Venezuela
Source: Jnfomwiion Notice System, IME.
Note: An increase in the index denotes a real exchange rate appreciation.
A Simple Model orprice Changes since March 1989
The arguments developed above suggests the following regression hypothesis:
p1=c4-a 4-j3LTX11 +yLIU11 +3Rd, +cr1 +tt+u.1 where t=l,2 Tisthe tune indei.q i 1,2 Nisthccountiyindcx;
p is the logarithm of secondary market prices; LTX is the logarithm of the ratio of total long-term debt to exports; LTG is the logarithm of the ratio of total long-term debt to GNP; RC'F is the logarithm of the ratio of commercial debt to total long-term debt r is the logarithm of the long-mn (10 year) US interest rate; I is a time trend component c is the common constant term; art thc countiy specific intercept terms and u is the usual error term.
As shown in Dooley and Stone (1993) For the larger sample ifable 4) the conventional measures of debt relative to the economic resources available to service the debt have the expected signs and arc statistically significant at conventional levels. These variables presumably capture the impact of debt reduction and improvemcnts in the debt service capacity of the debtor country. We also tested the importance of dummy variables often utilized in this literature to capture the effect of the announcement of loan loss reserves by some US banks in 1986 and the announcement of the Brady plan in 1989. These variables were not significant and did not affect the results when a simple time trend to reflect the gradual settlement of the negotiation environment during the debt crisis was also included.
For the smaller sample of countries, Our primary interest however is on the size and stability of the interest rate effect As shown in table 4, for the larger sample the interest rate has the expected negative sign and is near the expected value of a negative unit elasticity. That is a one percent change in the long term US Treasury bond interest rate, for example from 5 percent to 5.05 percent, generates about a one percent fall in market price. Moreover, if we add a time trend to the regression the effect of the interest rate variable increases and is considerably more precisely estimated.
To test the robustness of this result we also divided the sample into two time periods roughly corresponding to the period of generally rising prices before 1989 and generally rising prices thereafter (Table 6 ). Again the interest elasticity has the expected sign and is statistically significant, although the absolute size of the elasticity in the earlier time period is implausibly large. While the interest elasticity is -4.91 in the 1986-1989 period, it is -0.75 for the period 1989-1992. This discrepancy can perhaps be explained in terms of an omitted increasing investor pessimism, biasing that elasticity downwards when interest rates made a negative contribution (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) and upwards when interest rates made a positive contribution (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) . Such interpretation is further confirmed by the overall estimated elasticity of -1.70 when a time dummy is included (Table 4 ). Wbat appears clear, however, is that interest rates exerted a substantial effect in the expected direction during both phases. This is reassuring because interest rates increased in the first period and declined in the second period. See Appendix formore information.
Our interpretation of this evidence is that changes in international interest rates have had an important influence on market prices of existing debt of developing countries and, in turn, on the mcntry of residents of thcse countries to international credit markets.11 1Thc remarkably parallel evolution of prices in Brady and non-Brady countries shown in Figure 1 further confirms the notion that the intcrnational interest rates ale the key underlying factor.
A Simulation Exercise.
In this section we use the results reported in the previous section to assess the importance of interest rate changes and other factors to the evolution of secondary market prices for a composite "Brady Plan" country.
The econometric results support the use of the following simplified model for country i: Pa = (cBYrt where Bjt(xa)½ (g)'A (x and g being the exports-to-debt and CINP-to-debt ratios). This simple model has a unitary interest rate elasticity and is homogeneous in the country specific variables exports, GNP and debt'2 A more concrete assessment of the factors discussed above can be generated by this implication of this result is that what matters for the price of commercial bank debt is total debt rather than commercial bank debt. This is similar to findings in othcr cmpirical studies, for example, Bulow, Rogoff and Bcvilaqua (1992) . Wc stop short of concluding from that evidence that all creditors are equally senior, however, because this condition is necessary but not sufficient unless restrictive burdensharing models are assumed (for a discussion, see Dcmirgtlc-Kunt and Fernandez-Arias (1992) .
13 The Argentina operation is not included because, as noted above, its analysis is complicated by the inapplicability of prc-Brady prices as bcnclunarks. While lhcse problems arc also present to some extent in other Brady opcrations, the size of the Argentina operation may significantly distort the avcrage. bullion in commercial bank debt and a total net debt reducuion of about $29 billion. The stripped pricc ol the remaining commercial bank debt immediately after thc restructuring was about $0.54. 14 The expected present value of payments to commercial banks after the restructuring can be estimated as the stripped price limes thc debt equivalent outstanding, about $26 billion. "l'rcBrady" value of commercial bank debt was about $29 billion. This simple calculation suggests that if the expected value of official debt was unchanged, the initial market reaction to the Brady plan focused on the debt reduction but did not generate a mcasurable revision of expectations about the payments on the debt that could be clearly associated with efficiency gains. This interpretation is consistent with the view that official creditors sit senior to the banks.
Alternatively, the hypothetical assumption can be made that all creditors are equally senior. (Notice that this assumption is consistent with the simplified model where prices depend on total debt, rather that commercial bank debt.) In that case pie-Brady and stripped prices would apply to total debt. Under this assumption, the total expected present value of payments increased from about $69 billion in the absence of the operation to $92 billion after the operation. This would suggest that in the market's view Brady operations entail effects that go beyond the arithmetic effect of debt reduction.
For the purpose of this paper, the important points are: i) whatever the improvements brought about by the operations, they are relatively permanent and therefore unlikely to contribute to a down-side risk of falling secondary market prices, and ii) after the operations, sovereign risk in these countries, as measured by stripped prices, remains substantial.
We now analyze thc evolution of the stripped pricc in the average Brady "country" after the operations to show that improvements thereafter can be fully accountcd for by the decline in An interesting possibility is even this calculation underestimates the role of international interest rates and that the rise in market prices can be ovcreplained when the indirect beneficial effect on growth (and therefore the increase in the exports and GNP ratios x and g) is taken into account It sterns quite likely that the decline in the dollar risk free interest rate also accounts for the fall in domestic real interest rates in debtor countries. As discussed above, a fall in international rates should put downward pressure on domestic rates through interest arbitrage. In addition each of these governments pays a premium to domestic holders of public debt which in lSWe assume bert that the expected long run inilation rate for the United States did not change over this interval.
If expected inflation fell the predicted change in the price would be less since in this case the dollar value of expected payments thould increase. many cases reflects expected inflation and exchange rate dcpreciatioit A change in international interest rates that casts doubt on the ability of the government to finance debt service without resorting to the inflation tax could generate immediate increase in nominal and real domestic interest rates. Thus, a rise in international rates could generate even larger changes in domestic real rates. ha risc in international interest rates is associated with a more than proportionate rises in domestic rates, the possibility of a large fall in secondaxy market prices is even more likely.
This suggests that policy reforms may not have been crucial for the "average" country.
The explanation is that the change in the primary fiscal surplus for the "avenged country has been strongly negative since 1989. As mentioned above Mexico has managed a small increase in its operational surplus since 1989 but this is more than offset by Venezuela.
It is possible that the impressive levels of primary surpluses and expectations about improved policies have also played an important role in the observed capital inflows. The difficult question is whether or not these permanent factors could sustain market access if international interest rates and secondazy market prices fell to levels seen only three years ago.
It could be argued that the volume of private capital inflows recorded in developing countries is evidence that the improved outlook for these countries is robust to plausible changes in the economic environment. After all, investors are surely aware that international interest rates could rise as the industrial countries recover. The answer to this may be that the volume of private capital inflows is a poor indicator of expectations. In particular, we can think of the debtor country government as offcring foreign investors shod-term, dollar-denominated investments that carry an interest rate far in excess of what can be currently earned in the creditor countries. This is not to say that the debtor governments have again made the mistake of guaranteeing dollar-denominated debts of their residents explicitly as they did with syndicated credits. In this case the exchange and credit guarantee arc both implicit. The dominant form of private capital inflow (his time is a domestic currency claim on the debtor government, domestic banks and other domestic firms. The dollar value of these positions depends on the debtor government& commitment to defending an exchange rate with the dollar. In many cases the governments commitment is strong because it has based its inflation target on a fixed exchange rate. In these circumstances a devaluation is seen as a major departure from the objective of p6cc stability.
The governments commitment is, to some extent, credible because it has accumulated a substantial war chest of rescrvcs to be used to defend the exchange ratc policy. In recent years, about one half of the private inflow to Latin American debtor countries has been matched by increase in official reserves. Thus, the investor has some comfort that the high domestic currency interest rate will also be a high dollar interest rate. Moreover, by keeping investments in the banking system or in government securities, the investor has some assurance that these investments will be backed by the government even if domestic firms become insolvent This is all quite reminiscent of the late 70s in that, as long as the private capital flows in and the official capital flows out, there is no reason to limit the size of the capital inflow. In effect the government is acting as a a financial intermediary that lends cheap and borrows dear. The only limiting factor on the volume of such a business is the net worth of the intermediary.
Suppose the debtor government let the exchange rate be determined in a clean float.
Would private capital inflows continue to be veiy large? Our guess is that they would not, and in fact would not even match the very large current account deficits now being recorded.
Conclusions
Secondary market prices may be more informative as a barometer of the financial strength of a debtor country as compared to the volume of observed private capital inflows. A reversal in US interest rates could generate real trouble for debtor countries, particularly if it spreads to domestic markets. The related fall in secondary markets would signal a halt of recent capital inflows, rapid declines in international reserves and exchange rate depreciatiot Fiscal reform has been impressive in a few countries but in general has not built the kind of cushion into the finances of most debtor countries that could easily oIftet debt service payments that would result. Moreover, additional fiscal adjustment might draw much less popular support if it merely undeipins increased service payments.
There have been important "permanent' improvements in many debtors' financial positions. Debt reduction, both through external debt restructuring and amortization through operational budget balances, has reduced the vulnerability of a few debtor countries. Moreover, permanent reforms of fiscal systems have strengthened the debt service ability of some countries. Nevertheless, recent capital inflows have not been restricted to countries with strong economic adjustment programs. Falling dollar interest rates have dramatically reduced secondary market discounts, and in many cases brought them close to zero (the limiting situation that characterizes the unrestricted access to markets of solvent sovereign debtors). It seems likely that rising dollar interest rates could reverse this situation.
and not rejected at the 95 percent confidence level in the context of a more general model involving the (log of) exports, GNP, commercial debt stocks and total debt stocks.
The robustness of the result was tested by including two time dummy variables: one to reflect the general drop in secondary market prices in 1987 following a change in the reserve policy of Citibank and another one to capture the anticipation effect of the announcement of the Brady Plan in 1989. They were both insignificant when a time trend component was included in the specification.
Serial auto correlation does not appear to be a problem according to the Sargan-Frazini test. Correcting for autocorrelation using the Prais-Winsten transformation introduces only marginal changes to the estimations of interest.
